

SA Intelligencer

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From the editor

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Sometimes it is really difficult as an analyst to stay objective when reporting developments in your own country. While I compiled this Intelligencer, feelings of outrage, disbelief and deep sorrow about the intelligence profession in South Africa plagued me. It seems as though the entire intelligence community, save Defence Intelligence, is in shambles. I know morale is at an all-time low with resultant disastrous impact on our country's fight against insecurity and crime.

This edition of SA Intelligencer focuses on developments in the intelligence sphere on the African continent. From Southern Africa we offer news from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia. It is becoming clear that East African governments are strengthening intelligence relations with the US and Israel. I summarise a brilliant series on the US' intelligence involvement in East Africa since 2003. In West Africa, Nigeria is still struggling to get their security apparatus equipped to work against the Boko Haram threat.

The SA Intelligencer is published on an ad hoc basis and aim to inform decision makers and intelligence professionals on recent developments in the world of intelligence agencies. It is compiled from free open English sources All the articles are excerpted – click on the source link at the beginning of each report to access the original.

*Dalene Duvenage
Pretoria, South Africa*


Intelligence developments


 Africa

South Africa: Intelligence: from bad to worse...

Situation worsens in State Security apparatus

If you missed out on the developments prior to this edition, read the previous [SA Intelligencer](#). A summary of events the last 2 months follows here:



Spy boss Jeff Maqetuka resigned on 30 November 2011 after protracted tension between him and State Security Minister Siyabonga Cwele and President Jacob Zuma. (see previous SA Intelligencer). Cwele's adviser Dennis Dlomo will be acting in Maqetuka's place. Maqetuka will be 60 in January 2012 and has opted to retire then, rather than serve out his contract until the end of October 2012. He has opted to take "special leave" until he retires. Maqetuka had reportedly been unhappy about the snail's pace of the restructuring of the agency, which has been dragging on since 2009, and his relations with Cwele had been strained, reportedly over political interference in the agency. Maqetuka's

departure follows the recent resignation of Gibson Njenje, the head of State Security, the domestic arm of intelligence, over differences with Cwele.

In September 2011, Maqetuka met the parliament's joint standing committee on intelligence and afterwards held a meeting with his senior management. [Timeslive](#) reported that he said that "There was a broad consensus that all is not well within the civilian intelligence environment and that there exists a perception, both within and outside the intelligence community, that the State Security Agency has entered into a state of crisis and paralysis," "This crisis bodes neither well for the image of the country nor for the image of

the State Security Agency as a whole. It has resulted in the premature departure of [Njenje] and contributed to the *low morale* among agency members and to a general atmosphere of uncertainty," Maqetuka said. He said parliament had insisted that the crisis be resolved before it started threatening South

Moe Shaik to follow?

Rumours are rife that Moe Shaik, the head of the Foreign Branch of the SSA will also resign in the near future as "he has reached the end of his tether and will leave the department. He

Africa's security. "Remedial action, based on an analysis of the crisis, is required by all stakeholders of the civilian intelligence community in order to give leadership to the resolution of this unacceptable state of affairs," Maqetuka told his staff.

could resign within the next two weeks". The Sunday Times has been reliably informed that Shaik could take up a post as South Africa's next ambassador to Canada.

Dirty secrets of SA's spy agencies

Editor: The Sunday Times ran a report on 25 September 2011 on an oversight report of the SA Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence. The article sensationalised certain findings and recommendations of the JSCI and linked it to the current tension within the SA Intelligence community. See the actual words of the report or our comments in italics.

South Africa's intelligence services have been rocked by claims of financial mismanagement - and fears that the police crime intelligence unit is being infiltrated by foreign agents. Central to the claims are payments made to foreign intelligence "sources", while it has also emerged that an investigation is under way into how a broker was paid from a National Intelligence Agency account (*Sensationalized without factual support in report, e.g. no mention of the last point in official report*)

These are some of the findings of an oversight report drafted by parliament's joint standing committee on intelligence. The committee now wants:

- A ban on "sophisticated" cellphones and other devices that cannot be intercepted; (*Point 3.3.4: Consideration should be given to the testing of communication products sold to the RSA to see if they are interceptable. If not, they must be prohibited.*)
- Fraud investigations involving intelligence agents to be expedited; (*True: See point 4.10.1,2: both the*

Domestic and Foreign Branch had on-going fraud investigations pending, the latter concerning alleged mismanagement of source payments. The report does not state the extent/amounts involved) and

- Better coordination of intelligence structures to avoid infiltration by foreign agents. ("Infiltration" never used in report: Point 4.10.5 reads "The fragmented South African intelligence system continued to be exploited by FIS")

The committee also found that members of a ministerial panel (MRC) appointed to review the workings of civilian intelligence structures had been paid R5-million - while their findings were never acted on. (*The MRC handed their report to the Minister a year later than contracted. Their findings were not acted upon because of the putsch against then Pres Mbeki and the consequent resignation of Intelligence Minister Kasrils. The new cabinet then decided the report had no status in cabinet and would therefore not be acted upon.*)

Editorial Comment:

The report of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence has only been published on the web after 21 September 2011, although it is the report for the year ending 31 March 2010 – 18 months later! This in itself poses questions regarding the parliamentary oversight and

accountability function of the JCSI. Surely this report could have been communicated earlier! The deliberations of the JCSI and its reports remains closed for scrutiny, citing classification protocols. These problems reflect the

debilitating state of our intelligence services, but are not the real reasons behind the ongoing dysfunction –political interference and poor leadership.

NIA front company allegedly acts fraudulently

City Press: 6 November 2011 (Ed: excerpted)

A former national intelligence agency (NIA) operative, who is now a private security consultant, has lifted the veil on how the intelligence agency used a front company to create 25 secret bases across the country fitted with sophisticated monitoring equipment. The revelations are contained in a lawsuit by PJG Integrated Security and Safety Consultants, which is suing Hedgeway Staffing and Admin Solutions, a front company for the NIA.

According to court papers, the front company has broken South African companies law and tax regulations and acted fraudulently. The court papers give insight into the workings of the intelligence agency in SA, and claim that payments – even transactions amounting to millions – are all done in cash. The papers also say Hedgeway has no financial statements or articles of



The Wall of Remembrance at the SSA HQ Musanda outside Pretoria

association and was simply used as a shell for handling contracts with external contractors. Because all its transactions are made in cash, NIA even paid the substantial bank charges on these cash deposits for contractors. Hedgeway was liquidated earlier this year, and a court sheriff tried to seize its assets at NIA's headquarters in Pretoria, but he was sent packing by the intelligence agency's officials.

Following the sheriff's visit, Galloway's legal team received a threatening lawyer's letter from NIA which accused him of breaking the law and said if he pursued his claim he would be charged and his farm attached. He doesn't own a farm. He's now preparing for the legal "interrogation" later this month of some top NIA officials in terms of the Companies Act. They could be interrogated in open court about the agency's affairs and methods.

Cabinet approves General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill 2 years after proclamation

[defenceWeb](#) Tuesday, 01 November 2011

Cabinet has approved the introduction of the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill, 2011, on 26 October 2011. n Parliament. The amendment seeks to contribute to national security through the formation of an effective, efficient and a single department for South Africa's civilian intelligence structures. A Cabinet statement says the Bill will disband the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), South

African Secret Services (SASS) and South African National Academy of Intelligence (SANAI) and transfer their functions a State Security Agency (SSA) within a Department of State Security. NIA will become the "domestic branch" of the SSA and the SASS the "foreign branch".

The Bill comes two years after Minister of State Security Siyabonga Cwele announced a major

overhaul of the South African intelligence community in order to cut duplication as well as waste and “put intelligence at the core of government business.” Announcing the move in October 2009, Cwele said too much of the country’s intelligence budget – then estimated

at R2.8 billion – is “being spent on corporate affairs rather than on operations which is the core business of any intelligence service.” Treasury documents show the current budget, regarded a state secret, is some R4 billion.

The Secrecy Bill: Paranoia...or not?

Editor: SA Intelligencer has reported extensively about the debate surrounding the Protection of Information Bill that was passed by Parliament on Tuesday 22 November 2011. Civil society, the media and even senior ANC members or sympathisers, have called this bill a travesty to South Africa’s new democracy. Their main gripe remains the absence of the a public interest clause. It is curious that the government did launch a public awareness or PR campaign on how other democracies deal with the protection of information and how SA differs or concurs with this. Here follows a bird’s eye view of the intelligence angles in the press:

Securocrats' paranoia threatens democracy

Times Live; 22 November, 2011 (Ed: excerpted)

If you want to know why Minister of State Security Siyabonga Cwele wants to pass the Protection of State Information Bill in its current form, look at his speech to the National Assembly last week. Since 1994, he said, South Africa has been facing “an increasing threat of espionage”.


“The foreign spies continue to steal our sensitive information in order to advantage their nations at the expense of advancement of South Africa and her people,” he said.

“However, you won’t find foreign spies openly marching in the streets of Cape Town complaining that we are removing their easy access to our sensitive information, but they will fund their local proxies to defend their illegality.”

Aside from being a grievous insult to the

thousands of ordinary South Africans who have voiced their protest to this bill, the accusation that these communities are being funded by foreign spies tells us everything we need to know about the ministry’s concerns. Such an absurd claim reveals the paranoia that runs thick and deep in South Africa’s state security apparatus. It is because of this paranoia that the bill invests so much power in the hands of spooks, giving them control of the flow of information between a government and its people.

There is a legitimate need in every democracy to guard sensitive information from those who would use it to carry out acts of violence on our people. There is also a need to promote the right of access to information - only through the right to know can we exercise control over



government. The bill before the National Assembly today gets that balance wrong because it promotes the interests of the security cluster over the rights of the public. And, crucially, last-minute drafting by MPs has ensured that the secrecy act would trump the

Kasrils slams Cwele's 'spies' jibe

[IOL](#) November 18 (ed: excerpted)

Former intelligence minister Ronnie Kasrils has condemned as “disgraceful” his successor’s claim that opponents protesting against the Protection of State Information Bill are agents (proxies) of foreign spies. State Security Minister Siyabonga Cwele made the assertion during the [debate](#) on the bill in the National Assembly on Wednesday. “This is precisely the mindset that I fear as a former minister of intelligence,” Kasrils said on Thursday night. “Consider the impact of such inflammatory statements on members of the intelligence services. “They will be encouraged to adopt a mindset already noted for excessive secrecy, exaggerated fears and paranoia. And they are the very officials who the bill entrusts with all the tasks under the bill once it becomes law.” Kasrils said he had proposed a public interest defence for a 2008 draft of the same bill, after consultations with journalists. It was never tabled in Parliament, but was “scrapped



Promotion of Access to Information Act, which promotes citizens' right to know and to access information from the government - in other words, where secrecy and openness come into conflict, secrecy wins every time.

by ruling party representatives at the committee stage after I resigned from government in September 2008”.

In [reaction](#), The ANC has accused former intelligence minister Ronnie Kasrils of wanting to rule the state security department "from the grave". ANC spokesperson Jackson Mthembu said the party found his criticism on the Protection of State Security Bill strange. Comradede Kasrils failed to deal with the mess in the then department of intelligence, where he was a minister, which left us vulnerable to machinations of foreign spies, information peddlers, and espionage activities."

The SA National Editors’ Forum (Sanef) said on Thursday it took “strong exception” to Cwele saying “foreign spies” were funding civil society groups as their proxies to oppose the bill. “Sanef is one of the groups that oppose the bill and rejects the minister’s claims as insulting and libellous,” said chairman Mondli Makhanya.

Police Crime intelligence in shambles

Editor: The South African Police Service’s image has been further damaged by developments in recent weeks. Let’s start with the long, sorry list: firstly, Former National Commissioner of Police and Interpol Chief, Jackie Selebi’s appeal against his corruption conviction and 15 years sentence failed and he had to report to jail last weekend. In October 2011, the current National Commissioner, Bheki Cele, was suspended by Pres Zuma after allegations of corruption over rental agreements for police offices. In recent days, the beleaguered Crime Intelligence Unit was cleansed after an investigation there on corruption and fraud involving the Secret Services Fund. Only one member of the South African Police Service’s Crime Intelligence Division management, Dr Chris de Kock of the Crime Intelligence Analysis Unit, remains in his post. A recap on the most important information emanating from the investigation follows:

In recent months, crime intelligence head, Richard Mdluli, was arrested over his alleged role in the murder of his former girlfriend's husband. The crime intelligence chief of Gauteng (SA's most important province), Major-General Joey Mabasa, received a multimillion-rand golden handshake when he was discharged from the unit. Both men are facing charges of corruption and fraud.

The Chief financial officer, Major-General Solly Lazarus, was suspended in November 2011 after allegations of corruption, fraud, maladministration, nepotism and theft in the division. Some of the allegations made include R30 million missing from the unit's secret services account which is meant to be used for the payment of informers and the running of safe houses and operations. Instead, intelligence officers are alleged to have used the fund to pay for expensive vehicles, overseas trips, expensive clothing, jewellery and property in South Africa and overseas. The [Mail and Guardian](#) reported on 9 December 2011 that "About 80% of the secret services account is siphoned off illegally and only about 20% is used for legitimate operations," the source claimed. The source said that the level of abuse was "unbelievable" and the division "is a world of its own". "Last year there were probably only about five legitimate operations -- they spend millions on operations that don't exist." Another source said that "many of the projects are sustained by fabricating information, with the sole purpose of making cash. With this money,



personnel can pay for lavish dinners, parties and fancy cars." The intelligence source said senior officers brought many family members into the division and that most were sent to the technical support unit or the agent programme. Two sources said that, because checks and balances were lacking, informants' fees were easily abused. Handlers routinely pocketed some of the payments, they said. Payments, based on the perceived value of the information, could be as high as R500 000. "The handler motivates the amount by filling in a form," a source said. "The bigger the amount, the bigger the handler's cut." Another source claimed that handlers fraudulently listed their relatives as informants and then faked their reports.

Former crime intelligence boss Mulangi Mphego has also been linked to mismanagement and was allegedly still receiving monthly instalments from the fund of up to R100 000.

The head of the division's operational intelligence analysis, Major-General Mark Hankel; the acting divisional commissioner of crime intelligence, Major-General Vele Matshatshe; and Major-General Khosi Sinthumile were redeployed to other units outside crime intelligence.

A private crime intelligence bugging company, based in Pretoria, lists Lazarus, redeployed Brigadier Banzi Nyanda and former crime intelligence boss Mulange Mphego as directors. It may form part of the Hawks investigation.

Zimbabwe: Espionage charges withdrawn

[The Zimbabwean](#) 18 November 2011 (Ed: excerpted)

The State has withdrawn outrageous espionage charges against two Zimbabwean businessmen charged with illegally setting up satellite communication equipment and leaking official secrets to foreign countries. They are now being charged with breaching the Post and Telecommunications Act. Africom acting chief

executive, Simba Mangwende, and non-executive director, Farai Rwodzi, together with Oliver Chiku of Global Satellite Systems, were charged under the Orwellian Official Secrets Act. That charge has been dropped, and the State is now pursuing the charge of contravening Section 33 (i) of the Postal and

Telecommunications Act that makes it an offence for one to illegally possess, control or work for a radio station. The trio allegedly installed communication equipment at a yet-

to-be-disclosed location and connected it to the Africom main network system without the authority or knowledge of Africom management.

CIO in dagger-fight

Zimbabwe Mail: 4 December 2011 (Ed: excerpted)

In a spell-binding case, two suspended senior Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) operatives have dragged the dreaded spy agency to court, demanding re-instatement on the basis that there is no law in Zimbabwe governing the operations of the organisation. The extremely rare case is likely to re-ignite national debate around the security sector, as well as the desperate need for reforms in these shadowy and much abused structures. CIO chief administration officer David Nyabando and chief transport officer Ricky Manwere were suspended in 1998 from the

spy agency over a Z\$17 million fraud that they allegedly committed. The CIO alleges that Nyabando and Manwere defrauded the state of cash that was supposed to be used for building "safe houses". On their part, the two officers insist that they built the safe houses but were pushed out of the spy agency in controversial circumstances. Nyabando and Manwere were jointly charged with Lovemore Mukandi, the former deputy director-general of the CIO — who was arrested at the airport in September this year after his deportation from Canada.

Wikileaks fallout: High Court orders Director-General of CIO to justify defamation damages claims

Bulawayo24: 7 December 2011 (Ed: excerpted)

The High Court of Zimbabwe has ordered director-general of the Central Intelligence Organisation Major General Happyton Bonyongwe to justify the US\$10 million he is claiming from Africa Consolidated Resources director Mr Andrew Cranswick as defamation damages.

Maj Gen Bonyongwe (Retired) is claiming US\$10 million from Mr Cranswick for allegedly supplying defamatory information to the United States embassy accusing the CIO boss and other high-ranking officials of illegally profiteering from Chiadzwa diamonds. The information was later published by WikiLeaks on the Internet.

According to the summons prepared by Mr Joseph Mafusire of Scanlen and Holderness, on November 6 2008, Mr Cranswick reported to



**ZCIO Chief
Happyton Bonyongwe**

some US embassy officials that there was a small group of high-ranking Zimbabwean officials that was allegedly illicitly extracting tremendous personal diamond profits from the Chiadzwa diamonds in Marange. Among the officials Mr Cranswick alleged to have been benefiting were Maj Gen Bonyongwe, Reserve Bank Governor Dr Gideon Gono, the First Lady Amai Grace Mugabe, Vice President Joice Mujuru, Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga and his estranged wife Jocelyn and Manicaland Governor Chris Mushowe. Based on the report, it is alleged, the then US Ambassador to Zimbabwe Mr James McGee created a diplomatic cable on November 12 2008 titled "Regime Elites Looting Deadly Diamond Field". Maj Gen Bonyongwe denies extracting or selling any diamonds as alleged describing the information as false.

People

The Human Resources Director of the ZCIO, **T. Mlambo**, in September 2011 left the country to take up an undisclosed top post with Zimbabwe's spy network in Malaysia. ([The Zimbabwean 21 Sept 2011](#))

DEPUTY Director external in the President's Department, **Nothando Thuthani**, died on 28 September 2011. She was the highest ranking woman officer in the Central Intelligence Organisation. Thuthani's death comes hard on the heels of the death of Deputy Director General Cde Menard Muzariri who died in April 2011. ([Zimbabwe Mail 1 Oct 2011](#))

Mozambique: Assembly passes bills on intelligence service

[The Zimbabwean](#); 1 Dec 2011 (ed: excerpted)

The Mozambican parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, on 1 December 2011 passed the first reading of a bill on the status of members of the State Intelligence and Security Service (SISE), providing them with a legal framework to protect their rights and establish their duties, as is already the case with members of the police and armed forces. The bill states that the "indispensable conditions" for recruitment to SISE are "recognised civic and patriotic suitability, professional competence, and relevant academic training".

SISE members are banned from "interfering in the private life of citizens or in the operations



of public and private institutions and companies". They must not undertake any activities which "threaten the principles enshrined in the constitution and the law", and must not usurp any powers that belong to the courts, the police or the public prosecutor's office.

They are also barred from releasing any information about SISE to the media, and cannot write or publish anything concerning their work without authorisation.

Any interference in the lives of citizens will lead to dismissal, as will the unauthorized possession of firearms, or involvement in any illegal business or financial activities.

Zambia: Czech President Klaus writes to President Sata over detained Czechs

[Lusaka Times](#); 28 Nov 2011 (Ed: excerpted)

Czech President Vaclav Klaus has written a letter to his Zambian counterpart Michael Sata that was conveyed by a special Czech envoy, voicing his conviction that the three Czechs detained in Lusaka did not plan any crime, he told journalists. Klaus wrote he hopes that the case will be assessed quickly and justly. The Czech tourists were caught photographing military barracks and an air base in Lusaka in October. They were arrested on suspicion of espionage. They face up to 25 years in prison, if found guilty. They have dismissed the accusations.

After a week in prison, they were released on bail but they cannot leave Zambia. Klaus wrote he has been closely watching the case of the three Czech men, Jiri Cetl, Jan Coufal and Michal Veber.

"I had the impression that the matter will be cleared up and that they will be able to leave for home," Galuska said.

He also met the Czechs in Zambia and found out that they are in a good physical as well as psychological condition, he said,

Klaus wrote that accusations were levelled against the three as they photographed buildings and objects on public display, some of which accidentally found themselves in military and government buildings' vicinity.

Based on detailed information Klaus has received since the beginning of this unfortunate incident, he wrote, he would like to express his conviction that the three Czechs did not intend to commit any crime, but only wanted to photograph a training aircraft made in the Czech Republic, that was accidentally on display in a public area.

Kenya & Uganda: building stronger ties with Israel

UPI.com 6 December 2011 (ed: excerpted)

President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of Kenya both visited Israel in November. They met with President Shimon Peres, Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Israel and Kenya signed a security pact during Odinga's visit.

Museveni also met Tamir Pardo, director of the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence service. It clandestine contacts abroad have often paved the way for secret alliances or formal diplomatic relations. The Mossad connection was particularly evident in Museveni's visit. It was largely arranged by Rafi Eitan, a former Mossad director of operations. Eitan, Israel's pensioner affairs minister in 2006-09, is seeking to establish business operations in Uganda.

Israel's Defense Ministry recently cleared private Israeli security firms to operate in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan. That includes setting up arms sales. In 2004, two Israelis

were arrested in Jordan for providing arms to Sudanese secessionists, the same group that now governs South Sudan. The pair claimed at that time their co-conspirators included the son of a former head of the Mossad and Amos Golan, a former Special Forces commander known to be involved in arms deals in Uganda, Angola and other parts of Africa.

Both Museveni and Odinga expressed deep concern about the spread of Islamic militancy in Africa, most notably in North Africa, the Horn of Africa and most recently in oil-rich Nigeria. Ugandan and Kenyan forces are fighting Islamic militants of al-Shabaab, which has links to al-Qaida, in Somalia.

Odinga's office said Netanyahu pledged to help Uganda build "a coalition against fundamentalism" that included Ethiopia, which during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie was a close Israeli ally, South Sudan and Tanzania.

Uganda: US intelligence support to fight LRA

Denverpost.com 8 December 2011

The U.S. special-operations troops have been arriving in the southeastern Central African Republic town of Obo since the beginning of the month, said a U.S. official in Kampala, Uganda, who wouldn't say how many troops were deployed. The United States plans to deploy 100 troops in the mission to help the Ugandan and other national armies kill or apprehend Kony, but most of those American personnel will be based in Kam pala coordinating logistics and communications,

the U.S. official said. It is the largest deployment of U.S. forces to an African conflict zone since Marines landed in Liberia in 2003. On October 14, 2011, the President reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that he had authorized the deployment of approximately 100 U.S. armed forces to serve as advisors to "regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield." The report emphasized that the deployed

personnel “will only be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces. **Editor: See [Congressional Research](#)**

[Service Report](#) *The Lord’s Resistance Army: the US Response: 21 Nov 2011.*

Somalia: U.S. Predator drones flying out of Ethiopia

[ABC News](#) 28 Oct 2011 and [Press TV](#) (Iran) 2 Dec 2011 and [Guardian](#) 2 Dec 2011 (ed: excerpted)

The Obama administration confirmed on 20 October 2011 that it had been quietly operating unarmed Reaper drones out of Arba Minch Airport in southeastern Ethiopia airport as part of the ongoing U.S. counterterrorism effort targeting al Shabab in Somalia. PressTV reported on 2 December that several people were killed in Somalia’s southwestern region by drone attacks.



A US Reaper drone

(Ed: Press TV is unreliable and accused of misinformation. It was [fined](#) 100,000 Pounds on 1 December 2011 for inaccurate reporting regarding US drone attacks in Somalia and is seen as part of the Iranian anti-US propaganda machine).

White House spokesman Jay Carney said the drones were operating from Ethiopia “as part of our partnership with the government of Ethiopia to promote stability in the Horn of Africa.” He added, “The UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] are not conducting any strike missions from Ethiopia. There are no U.S. military bases in Ethiopia.”

State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said the U.S. has “an intense partnership” with the Ethiopian military in training peacekeeping troops and counterterrorism assistance. “We are working

together on a broad, sustained and integrated campaign to counter terrorism. And in doing so, we are harnessing all tools of American power. So obviously, the Ethiopians themselves don’t have these advanced drone aircraft that can provide intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, so we support their counterterrorism efforts with these aircraft.”

MQ-9 Reaper drones are newer versions of Predator drones that were deadlier than the original because they are capable of carrying more Hellfire missiles and bombs, and have a greater range. Despite these offensive capabilities, Carney and Nuland emphasized that the drones were not carrying weapons and were only conducting reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

Fisher said the drone flights “will continue as long as the government of Ethiopia welcomes our cooperation on these varied security programs.” Fisher explained that the Air Force personnel at the airport are not stationed there, but working there temporarily. The U.S. has also been operating unarmed Reaper surveillance flights from the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean as part of an anti-piracy effort against Somali pirates who have made the waters off of East Africa some of the most dangerous in the world.

Reports detail US intelligence operations in Somalia

[Military Times](#) Oct-December 2011 (Ed: Excerpted focusing on tradecraft aspects)

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US military special operations teams carried out frequent espionage and counter-terrorism missions inside Somalia starting in 2003, according to Sean Naylor, a reporter for the privately owned Virginia-based newspaper, Army Times. In his six part series, He attributes the disclosures mostly to anonymous sources currently or formerly affiliated with US military or intelligence services.

[Part 1, The Secret War: How U.S. hunted AQ in Africa](#)

Naylor describes how a clandestine SEAL mission planted Cardinal devices along the Somali coastline in November and December 2003. The aim was to place them facing locations such as potential al-Qaida training camps or piers where al-Qaida personnel were suspected of arriving.

The plan was to emplace 17 cameras along the Somali coastline, according to the special ops source. But the embassy “didn’t see the wisdom in any of them,” said an intelligence source with long experience in the Horn. In Bellamy’s view, the hidden camera operation “was overkill,” the intelligence source said. The question being asked in the embassy was, “Why are we creating this Ferrari when all you had to do was pay a guy to go in” and set up the cameras, the intelligence source said. To U.S. officials in Nairobi, it appeared to be the SEALs who were pushing hard for the mission, the source said.

On at least one occasion, the best place for the camera turned out to be on a rusted, wrecked ship in a harbor, the special ops source said. On another occasion, the SEALs



Journalist Sean Naylor

put the camera on a breaker made of rocks near a pier, he added.

On Jan. 12, 2004, fishermen from the village of Ras Kamboni made an odd discovery on the rocky, depopulated island of Buur Gaabo, just off the southeastern Somali coast: one or more cameras “and other electronic devices,” according to the website Somalilandtimes.net.

They could only guess at the equipment’s origin and purpose, but it seems clear they had stumbled upon a Cardinal device, underlining Bellamy’s reservations about the SEAL missions.

Asked what the secret camera missions achieved, the intel source

with long experience on the Horn answered bluntly: “Nothing.”

What the extraordinary nature of the SEAL missions underlined, the senior intelligence official said, was the paucity of technical intelligence collection assets — especially Predator drones — available to the military and CIA officials charged with tracking down al-Qaida operatives in Somalia.

[Part 2: Lack of human intel hampered AQ hunt in Africa](#)

The chastened Barcott had run head first into one of the major problems that plagued U.S. operations in the Horn of Africa in the years after 9/11: the lack of a basic understanding of the region among the personnel charged with operating there. “At a very fundamental level, we simply lacked that baseline that we needed,” said a military targeting official. “We didn’t understand the culture, we didn’t understand the people ... in a real sense we didn’t understand the players and how they related in the various organizations inside the various cities in the Horn.”

As they examined new streams of intelligence, what the spooks saw alarmed them. The flow

of individuals from the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater to Yemen and Somalia amounted to no more than what a senior intelligence official described as “a trickle,” but what “worried” U.S. officials was “which kind of personalities were showing up,” said a special operations officer who had access to the intelligence. As much as the movement of senior al-Qaida individuals, it was the network’s transfer of money into the region that set alarm bells clanging in Washington and elsewhere because that was considered a key indicator that operational planning was occurring, he said.

What was missing “was human intelligence on the most fundamental level,” the targeting official said. “It was ‘do we really understand what they mean in this culture when they say this?’ ... It’s not enough to simply translate something; you need to understand it.”. However, intelligence was “so hard to collect since no one speaks Somali or they don’t speak the dialects up in Eritrea,” he added. “It was adequate for what we had to do.”

“As our human intelligence network got better, our confidence level as to what these [al-Qaida] guys were doing really grew,” the intelligence official said. “So we argued and debated and finally won to get the right amounts of ISR ... because in order to understand what the hell’s going on, you’ve got to build human intelligence networks, you’ve got to build technical networks — Predators, Global Hawks, etc. — to be able to understand the environment.

Part 3: Clandestine Somalia missions yield AQ targets

Starting in 2003, small teams of U.S. operatives would clamber aboard a civilian turboprop plane at a Nairobi, Kenya airfield to embark on one of the most dangerous missions conducted by U.S. personnel in Somalia since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

Those first secret missions were all about gathering human intelligence — “collecting information, validating information,” said the source. But they soon expanded to include working with warlords to hunt al-Qaida members, tapping cellphones, purchasing anti-aircraft missiles and, ultimately, developing a deeper understanding of al-Qaida’s East African franchise and how it fit into the wider al-Qaida network. The Mogadishu missions became one of the most successful U.S. intelligence operations in the Horn.

The teams would hop a commercial flight that departed Nairobi every morning bringing the day’s supply of khat — the plant whose leaves are chewed as a narcotic stimulant by Somali men — to the Somali capital of Mogadishu, the intelligence source said.

Operation Black Hawk’s aim was to kill or capture the 20 or so main members of the al-Qaida cell in East Africa. But rather than use U.S. forces to do this, the CIA’s plan would have Somali warlords capture the al-Qaida personnel before turning them over to the

U.S. to send — or “render” — them to an American ally or one of the agency’s secret prisons, said sources who served in the region. Thus small teams composed of CIA case officers, TF Orange special operators and what a senior intelligence official called “really high-end interpreters” would land at K50 and travel to and through Mogadishu in small convoys escorted by fighters loyal to one warlord or another.

The convoys’ routes crossed the boundaries between several warlords’ territories, so a lot of coordination was required between the U.S. personnel and the warlords and among the warlords themselves, according to the intelligence source. The Americans used a carrot-and-stick approach, offering the warlords cash if they helped, with the implicit threat of U.S. air power if they didn’t. But the warlords’ fear of being whacked by U.S. air

MISSION IN AFRICA

A dearth of human and technical intelligence hampered the campaign by U.S. special operations forces and the CIA to track down al-Qaida operatives in the Horn of Africa. The demands of the Iraq war left U.S. forces lacking a “baseline” of knowledge about events in Ethiopia and Somalia.



power was groundless. There were no U.S. aircraft overhead. In an effort to develop targets, the CIA, supported by TF Orange, ran a series of missions into Mogadishu to “seed” the city with devices that monitored cellphone traffic, according to a senior military official. This required repeated trips to Mogadishu, said the senior military and intelligence officials. The ability to listen to al-Qaida in East Africa’s phone calls paid big dividends.

But monitoring al-Shabaab and al-Qaida phone traffic did more than help U.S. intelligence officials with their manhunts. It also gave them a deeper understanding of how interlinked some of the violent Islamist groups were, according to the intelligence official. “There

were [telephone] communications between Pakistan and Somalia,” the official said. “It was the communicators for the key [al-Qaida] guys [in Pakistan], and also from Yemen and from Iraq and from North Africa. So we really saw this blossoming of their network start to grow, and that’s really, really when we began to realize just how much they were franchising the movement out of Pakistan. The phone-monitoring gear is probably still operating, the intelligence official said.

The U.S. paid the spies roughly \$1,000 to \$2,000 a month to enter southern Somalia and report what they observed. But even these local hires found little evidence of al-Qaida in Ras Kamboni, according to the source

Part 4: Years of detective work led to al-Qaida target

To crack the Mombasa case, U.S. investigators proceeded from “an assumption” that the militants had used cellphones, based on the attacks being “two near-simultaneous events relatively close together, geographically — probably no more than 20 miles apart,” the intelligence source said. The next step was to get the records of all the cellphone calls made during the period just before the attacks and determine “all the numbers that never made a call again,” the source said. In addition, investigators “went back and looked at where they bought the scratch cards and where they bought the phones,” he added.

It took “a few months” for U.S. intelligence agents to figure out which cellphone numbers were associated with the attackers, the source said. The key to the breakthrough was the militants’ sloppy tradecraft: One of them was apparently given money to buy two sets of phones and SIM cards, but figured he could keep some cash for himself by just buying one set of phones, mistakenly thinking that switching out the SIM cards provided enough operational security. “They used the same

phones but different SIM cards,” the source said. “They didn’t understand you could track the phone too.”



Israeli intelligence agents also gave the Americans a lot of information and asked the U.S. agents to work with them, the source said. “The Israelis were key initially,” the source said. “Clearly, they had their own sources in the region.”

One way Nabhan evaded his enemies for so long was by “rarely” communicating himself. “He’d send a message with somebody [and] they’d go to an email or hotmail account and send that message,” the source said. Al-Qaida in East Africa used a very basic “10 code” when passing on numerical information, the source said. The code involves replacing each digit with the number that would be required to bring the replaced number up to 10 — for instance, they’d write 539 instead of 571. “It’s really simple, but it took people a while to figure out they were doing it,” he said.

Perhaps aware of the growing U.S. ability to monitor their cellphone conversations, al-Qaida cell members switched much of their conversation to the Internet, the source said. But they didn’t change their email addresses

often enough, allowing U.S. intelligence to track them, the source said. Eventually, “we

[Part 5: The Secret War: Tense ties plagued Africa ops](#)

The close escape was a notable moment in a relationship between U.S. and Ethiopian forces that developed because each country perceived Somalia’s burgeoning Islamist militias as a threat but became strained as the U.S. pressed Ethiopia for more substantive on-the-ground cooperation.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and Ethiopian forces enjoyed a patchy relationship with the Kenyans as they tried to get Somalia’s southern neighbor to round up the most dangerous Islamists who fled across the border. The Kenyans sometimes either released Islamists sought by the U.S. “or they would just not let them in,” the senior

were able to find ways to break into” Nabhan’s communications, the source said.

intelligence official said. This ran counter to the U.S. desire for Kenya to allow the Islamists to cross the border so they could be detained and screened.

This type of behavior, in which a national ally could not be trusted to round up suspected Islamist fighters on its territory, prompted the intelligence source with long experience in the Horn to describe the region as a “wilderness of mirrors” characterized by “marriages of convenience” between government and nongovernment actors in the Somali drama. “You never really knew who was a true partner and who wasn’t,” the source said.

[Part 6: The Secret War: Africa ops may be just starting](#)

There was clearly something suspicious about the two western-looking “civilians” and their interpreter who the Ethiopian security forces were questioning. For a start, they were in Ethiopia’s bandit country — near the town of Fiq in the Ogaden region that borders Somalia. Secondly, they claimed to be working for the Red Cross, but a quick check of their persons turned up sidearms, which the Red Cross forbids its personnel from carrying. By the time the “civilians” admitted they were U.S. military personnel, the damage had been done. They were on their way to an Ethiopian jail, and an international incident was brewing. But the soldiers’ biggest error was to tell Ethiopian troops who confronted them they were members of a Red Cross team, Ghormley said. “The colossal mistake they made — the final mistake they made — was concocting a cover story,” he said. “It was a spur-of-the-moment thing, from what I understand.” “An incident occurred in which a couple of guys were detained,” said Fallon, who retired in 2008. “They were using poor judgment to go

to a place they shouldn’t have been, [which was] not authorized and not sanctioned and not smart.”

The soldiers had been carrying a lot of information about U.S. intelligence operations in the region that was instantly compromised. “All their documentation, papers, notepads, military stuff were collected [by the Ethiopians],” the State Department official said. “It was like amateur hour, this team that got rolled up,” the intelligence official said. “There was information that they had that they should not have been carrying ... It gave away techniques and procedures that we couldn’t afford to do, because we knew at that time that al-Qaida was building up its capability in Somalia and that was why we were trying damn hard to get into Somalia with really sensitive collection.” The incident “put a spotlight on everything” U.S. intelligence was doing in the Horn, the official said. “It became a big deal and it actually hurt us, I would say, for a couple of years ... around the region.”

Nigeria: Petinrin tasks defence attachés on intelligence gathering

[The Nation Online](#) 19 November 2011

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Chief Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin on Friday in Abuja called on Defence Advisers and Attachés to communicate intelligent information that would assist the country to curb the current security challenges. Petinrin made the call at the close of the 2011 Defence Advisers and Attachés Annual Conference, organised by the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the News Agency of Nigeria reports. "You are at the frontline because what we know is that all these terrorist organisations are involved with people outside



Nigerian Chief of Defence Staff
Air Chief Marshal Petinrin

the shores of this country. "So, we depend on you for timely intelligence, anything at all that looks useful ensure that we hear about. It is when we hear from various sections that we will be able to put up a good picture here. "So, you have a lot of responsibilities in this respect as this is our most serious challenge." "I know you are up to the task and your deliberations have been fruitful and we expect that you will assist those of us back home to continue to fight these people. And eventually they will realise that they cannot change anything," Petinrin said.

Indian DFS to help Nigeria fight fraud

[Times of India](#) 1 Dec 2011 (Ed: excerpted)

Considering the number of frauds generating from homeland and use of Nigeria's name by fraudsters of other countries, the Nigerian government agency has sought help of Directorate of Forensic Sciences (DFS), Gandhinagar, to solve difficult cyber crimes and train youths from Nigeria to fight the crimes at Gujarat Forensic Sciences University (GFSU). The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in this regard will be inked in January, said DFS officials.

DFS director general J M Vyas told TOI that a delegation consisting of National Intelligence Agency (NIA) of Nigeria's officials visited DFS on Tuesday. "They had heard about the cases solved by us and were interested to explore the possibility of cooperation in various fields. Their main area of concern was cyber crime. They visited our facilities and have shown interest to sign an MoU encompassing a number of issues including detection of crimes and training of

youth in forensics. The officials are expected to come in January to sign the MoU," he said.

DFS officials involved with the procedure said that the main concern of the officials was use of modus operandi of 'Nigerian scam' adopted by other nationals. "They told us that it is not only the foreigners who get duped by such scams but different modus operandi has found victims in Nigeria as well. They suspect that nationals of other countries now defame the country and thus they want to ascertain such cases. NIA is the national agency of Nigeria that looks after national, international and military intelligence," said a senior DFS official.

The official said that DFS will help NIA solve cyber crime cases initially, whereas NIA officials as well as youths of Nigeria will pursue online courses related to cyber security and cyber forensics in the second stage. "Talk is also on to admit the Nigerian nationals to GFSU for training if needed. However, the final decision will be taken before the MoU by both the



parties concerned. The delegation has also shown interest in learning other branches of

forensics. The education part will be handled by GFSU," the official added.

Jonathan tasks security agencies on intelligence gathering

NIGERIA COMPASS; 23 NOV 2011 (Ed: excerpted)

President Goodluck Jonathan yesterday challenged the nation's security agencies to intensify and sharpen their skills and attitude in the area of intelligence gathering and counter terrorism.

This he said becomes imperative in order to evolve new approach to the current security challenges. The president also stressed the need for greater cooperation with other nations engaged in the global war against terrorism in order to thwart the evil machinations of misguided terrorists and other promoters of violence in the country.



**Nigerian President
Goodluck Jonathan**

He decried that the past one year has been particularly challenging due to the various threats that have continued to confront the polity, adding that "the spate of violent crimes in parts of the country including kidnapping, armed robbery, bombings and threats from the activities of the Boko Haram sect are contemporary security challenges facing the nation."

According to him the major task of the nation's agencies was to deal with these apparent problems with the needed strategies they require. "The Nigerian Army must therefore intensify its efforts (in conjunction with other security agencies) to devise new innovative ways to address these challenges. This would be your major focus as you deliberate at this conference.

Ghana: Oil companies pose no danger to our intelligence – Ghana military

Modern Ghana Mon, 21 Nov 2011 (ed: excerpted)

The presence of oil companies in the restricted Ghana Air Force enclave in Takoradi has no security implications whatsoever, Director of Public Affairs for the Ghana Armed Forces, Colonel Mbawine Atintande has said.

The air force, according to Col. Atintande, has adequate measures in place to ensure its intelligence information is properly secure. He was responding to concerns that the country's intelligence could be jeopardised with the current arrangement where the oil companies, largely foreign

multinationals, are operating from the air force base in Takoradi.



Takoradi Air Force Base, Ghana ([Photobucket](#))

Some civil society organisations and politicians have raised concerns about the situation, fearing the companies could be using their proximity to the military installation to undertake covert operations and

intelligence gathering for their home countries. An official at the Energy Ministry is quoted by the Daily Graphic as saying that "...any sensitive information exchanged by the national security could be monitored or intercepted by anybody

standing by the building, a situation which is not the best.”

But Col. Atintande told Joy FM's Super Morning Show, the fears are unjustified. In any case if any person or group of persons desire to intercept intelligence communication of the air force, he insisted, they do not need to be close to the air force base to do so. “The companies themselves would not have necessarily just walked into the premises and taken the space.

These have been given out by the armed forces for a particular purpose and I don't think that there is any problem with that. “We have the capability to be able to ensure that at least our communication is not intercepted,” he stated.

“Nothing will happen,” he assured, adding, “we are taking care of any issues relating to any” attempt by any company to tap our intelligence communication

Libya: France wants to try Libya spy chief

[News 24](#): 2011-11-22 10:43

Paris - France said on Monday it wanted to try Libya's former spy chief, Abdullah al-Senussi, over a 1989 airliner bombing in Niger that killed 170 people including 54 French nationals.

A senior Libyan commander said on Monday that his fighters had captured Senussi, who is also wanted by the International Criminal Court. In 1999 a Paris court convicted six Libyans,



Former head of the Libyan Intelligence
Abdullah al- Senussi (Reuters)

including Senussi, and sentenced them in absentia to life imprisonment for the UTA bombing. Following the killing of Muammar Gaddafi a month ago, his son Saif al-Islam, who was captured over the weekend, and Senussi were the only surviving Libyans on the wanted list of the ICC.

Libya is standing firm over the trial of the younger Gaddafi, saying its courts can judge him fairly, and defying the ICC, which says it wants to try him at The Hague for crimes against humanity.

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